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As a 25 YO male this is an issue near and dear to me. IMO it all comes back to slow TFP [1] (total factor productivity) growth.

New technology is not (on aggregate) making us more productive, or growing the economy to the point where we need young, college educated men and women to learn productive new skills to sustain and grow our communities and the collective state and country level economy.

I went into the embedded industry to learn more about the people and companies that make all the things we take for granted or never think about as kids - cars, planes, industrial PLCs, oil rigs, pacemakers, insulin pumps, ATMs. Modern chip production, and what people have built from tiny MCUs and DSPs all the way up to the crazy beefy CPUs, GPUs, and FPGAs is as close to magic as I've found in the real world.

But the industry of "global infrastructure" - transportation of people and goods, war, healthcare, manufacturing, resource extraction, retail - as a whole is stagnant. Especially when compared to the golden century we are just coming out of, when our standard of living in developed nations jumped up exponentially due to distributed electricity, indoor plumbing, modern appliances, transistors, data transmission technology, internal combustion engines, and advances in chemical and medical technology (much of this accelerated by research into war technology). Economist Robert Gordon has studied this in detail here [2].

Video games are definitely a way to feel productive, achieve well-defined goals, and get a sense of accomplishment or progression that is often lacking in the workplace. But IMO in many cases they are a symptom of a larger issue, not a cause.

There are many forms of escapism, video games are just one that my generation is more accustomed to having grown up and made friends through social interactions over video games alongside traditional things like sports, clubs, parties, etc.

The growing need for escapism is IMO the larger issue.

[1] In economics TFP is a variable that attempts to capture the effect of technology and infrastructure on the production function. Since these effects are much too complex and indirect to calculate explicitly (how many more widgets can a factory produce because of the roads that allow their workers to drive into work from the suburbs?) it is imputed as a residual. http://www.karlwhelan.com/Macro2/Notes9.pdf

[2] https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Fall-American-Growth-Princeton/d...

⬐ RealityVoid

I also work in embedded and this issue is also dear to me, seeing how I've been there dealing with doubt and uncertainty for the future and my place as a young man in this world.

That being said, I think that your view is wrong and that tfp _has_ been growing and we have become better at productivity. It's just that is was very localized, the inequalities in productivity are very high and a whole class of people that used to be productive are not anymore(because of various and very complex reasons). Also, I think we, as a species have become complacent and some of us are wired to function better in "crysis" mode than in a normal world. Maybe being normal is one of our contemporary ailments

⬐ roymurdock

Data doesn’t support the idea that an increasingly few productivity superstars in crisis mode can push TFP forward:

https://www2.deloitte./insights/us/en/economy/behind-the-num...

My personal picks as I continue to try to understand global economic trends since the 1980's through the prism of the 2008-crash:

The Global Minotaur: America, Europe and the Future of the Global Economy by Yanis Varoufakis [1]

The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future By Stiglitz, Joseph E. [2]

The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War by Robert J. Gordon [3]

1. https://www.amazon.com/Global-Minotaur-America-Economic-Cont...

2. https://www.amazon.com/Price-Inequality-Divided-Society-Enda...

3. https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Fall-American-Growth-Princeton/d...

⬐ matt4077

You'd probably enjoy The Unwinding by George Packer[0].

I consider it "The Great American Non-fiction Novel".

[0] https://www.amazon.com/Unwinding-Inner-History-New-America/d...

⬐ grub5000

> The Global Minotaur: America, Europe and the Future of the Global Economy by Yanis Varoufakis [1]

Have you read "And the Weak Suffer What They Must?"? It's fantastic. Really helped shape my view before the EU Referendum here in the UK.

⬐ siavosh

Not yet, but it's on my list. I've been watching a lot of Yanis' talks on youtube, very compelling perspectives.

⬐ grub5000

Agreed. He's a pretty compelling presenter/speaker. He participated in a discussion on Channel 4 news [1] along with a former Kremlin Advisor that I find highly entertaining.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gZjqicN8Zug

⬐ siavosh

Have you found any notable economist that critiques his work?

⬐ grub5000

Haven't tried really, but no. I was too worn down by the referendum to willingly take any more...

⬐ conanbatt

He is more like a political figure than an economist theorist. I have yet to read the books but have seen many of his lectures and its so opinion-based that its hard to be critical. I think he is more of a communicator than a novel intellectual.

⬐ VodkaHaze

I think you would enjoy "How Nations Fail" by Acemoglu and Robinson, and the EconTalk podcast with Russ Roberts.

⬐ 551199

I've been meaning to read it but Gates review but me off[0]. Would you agree or disagree with it after reading the book?

[0] https://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Why-Nations-Fail

⬐ VodkaHaze

Disagree. Gate's main point is that the book is not rigorous, but it's based on a peer review literature (just making it accessible to laymen). So while some more technical people might get annoyed at the lack of rigor, it doesn't mean that it's not there, they just don't harass you with p values and endogeneity tests in the book.

⬐ clumsysmurf

Yanis gave a good endorsement of "How Will Capitalism End?: Essays on a Failing System" https://www.amazon.com/How-Will-Capitalism-End-Failing/dp/17...

Also you might like Dean Baker's latest book. You can get it free from his website in all formats, or via Amazon

"Rigged: How Globalization and the Rules of the Modern Economy Were Structured to Make the Rich Richer"

http://deanbaker.net/books/rigged.htm

⬐ siavosh

Thanks, yeah, already in the middle of Streeck's essay collection. Jarring.

I'm reading two books right now. The Rise and Fall of American Growth [1] by Robert Gordon and The Grapes of Wrath [2] by John Steinbeck. They complement each other, and this post, very well.

I would recommend Gordon's book as an objective overview of the astonishing growth in economic and quality of life terms from 1870-1970. It's not as thoroughly researched as I expected it to be, and the prose is somewhat clunky, but it's a good lesson in the history of technology that we take for granted nonetheless.

Steinbeck's tale of the banks/landowners displacing poor, rural farming families is also extremely pertinent in light of this post. Car dealers extract value from the fleeing, unnecessariat farmers in "Grapes", while insurance companies/debtors prisons extract value from the unnecessariat rural poor chronicled in this post. The promised land of "Grapes" (California) continues to be successful today, with the coasts accreting a large portion of the nation's wealth. It's also just a beautifully written and thoroughly considered (to the point of seeming spontaneous) piece of art.

I am waiting for the next paradigm shifting technology with bated breath.

[1] http://www.amazon.com/Rise-Fall-American-Growth-Princeton/dp...

[2] http://www.amazon.com/Grapes-Wrath-John-Steinbeck/dp/0143039...

⬐ dredmorbius

I've read Gordon and am planning a review (I've published a "first impressions" at https://reddit.com/r/dredmorbius). Some (brief?) thoughts:

1. His history of change 1870 - 2015 is good. Some weaknesses, but solid, and he makes his case for dramatic changes. A mention of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs would improve the discussion, but his point even without stating that is of drastic changes (and improvements) to basic food, shelter, clothing, and security needs.

2. He misses some infrastructure with his focus on consumer impacts. Less so with early work than in his discussion of information and communications infrastructure, in which I think there might be some weaknesses to his argument (and a possible out for the optimists).

3. You'll find the meat of his theory in the third section of the book. Chapters 15-17 IIRC. Focus your critical eye there.

I've got many quibbles with his economics arguments, though most of the errors actually bolster his overall argument -- I feel actual recent trends are worse than Gordon states.

Steinbeck's Grapes is a true classic. Reading that as a story of an epic animal migration (as Steinbeck begins it) is humbling.

The author of that NBER paper recently published a book that goes into the same topic in more depth[0]. It's definitely worth reading.

0: http://www.amazon.com/The-Rise-Fall-American-Growth/dp/06911...

The world economy slowed in 1973. No one really knows why. Some books focus on the effects in the USA, some focus elsewhere. In the West this has been "The Great Stagnation" whereas in several countries in Asia this has been "The Great Bounce Back" as formerly wealthy civilizations, such as China, recovered some of the ground they lost in the 1800s.

Sad to say, I'm not aware of any books that tell the whole international story.

For the USA, there have been an abundance of books and articles showing the decline of the middle class:

http://billmoyers.com/2015/01/26/middle-class/

Tyler Cowen came up with the phrase Great Stagnation:

http://www.amazon.com/Great-Stagnation-America-Low-Hanging-E...

Some writers treat this as a political issue:

http://www.amazon.com/Boiling-Point-Republicans-Middle-Class...

Some writers focus on long-term factors that have little to do with politics. Robert Gordon got good reviews for his historical analysis of the specialness of the 2nd Industrial Revolution 1860-1940, and why the current era is not as robust:

http://www.amazon.com/The-Rise-Fall-American-Growth/dp/06911...

⬐ steve-benjamins

Thanks. Just bought the Great Stagnation off of your comment.

⬐ roymurdock

Consider reading this literature review from an MIT professor of 21 different texts that tackle the Great Recession and its causes if you're looking for more info on the subject:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1949908

Lo thinks that the Reinhart/Rogoff This Time is Different is among the best-researched texts with the most quantitative support and analysis while still maintaining its readability.

⬐ TheOtherHobbes

1973 was the first oil crisis. Oil prices went up by 400% and there was a huge spike in inflation.(There's a book waiting to be written about the curiously close relationships between the Saudi and the US oil establishments, and the Saudi influence on US foreign policy since the 70s.)

The oil crisis gave the Right a convenient pretext to blame wage increases for inflation.

This became a standard element of economic orthodoxy, and ever since then increases in wages and salaries - which were a driver of post-war prosperity - have been labelled "inflationary', even though inflation is primarily caused by other factors.[1]

By a remarkable and unexpected coincidence, this was the moment when labour share of GDP and middle class prosperity both started to decline. See e.g.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wage_share#/media/File:Adjuste...

[1] The Bank of England always plays on this. About a year ago there was talk of increasing interest rates to "head off inflationary pressure" just in case wages might have started rising in the future. Meanwhile asset inflation in the form of rising property prices is ignored, and more obvious drivers of increasing costs, like consumer energy prices, are downplayed.

⬐ lkrubner

No one knows why 1973 was the beginning of a long era of economic sluggishness. Oil prices crashed in the 1980s and again in 1990s and again after 2008, but none of these crashes restarted the post-war boom. Adjusting for inflation, oil achieved new lows in the 1990s, and again in recent years, but the very low prices that we see are not enough to bring back the years when the economy grew at 4% on a regular basis. Nothing has revived productivity growth to the 3% a year seen for most of the era 1945-1973. If the spike in oil prices in 1973 was enough to start an era of sluggish growth, then why didn't growth restart once the oil prices collapsed? There are many theories about this, and many brilliant people have written long books trying to explain the events of the last 40 years, but no one knows for sure, and there is nothing like a consensus on the issue, which is why I wrote "No one really knows why."